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Abstract: What is wrong with causalist approaches to our valuing.
Those familiar with my more general views will be unsurprised to find me
ranting about the need to find philosophical room for the normative, as well
as the causal. In this respect, this typical thread in my ranting aligns in effect
with two points made by Frege in noting that ‘[e]rror and superstition have
causes just as much as correct cognition.’1 For, first, one cannot appeal to
the causal story to insist on the veridical character of our ‘experiences’ of the
world; and second, more crucially, we cannot reduce our normative process
to such causal explanation: just ‘[a]s I do not create a tree by looking at it,
. . . neither do I create a thought by thinking. And still less does the brain
secrete thoughts, as the liver does gall’2 Urging otherwise risks ‘. . . blurring the
boundary between logic and psychology’, a boundary (with natural scientific
explanation) fundamental to the province of philosophy.3
Now, it seems to me that in the fairly recent past there has arisen a new
way of making a similar mistake: but one that may seem to have avoided the
concerns of a journal such as Aesthetic Investigations—given its focus on the
philosophy of art and philosophical aesthetics—since the new ‘mistake’ has
typically been applied to moral philosophy. The error I am thinking about is
well-instantiated in the project of two papers, chosen as representative of the
trend: (a) Young and Durwin 2013; (b) Goodwin and Darley 2008.
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Both use broadly empirical methods to investigate whether a meta-ethical
commitment to kinds of moral realism might alter both one’s moral judge-
ments and one’s degree of commitment to them.4
I have never really known what most psychology does: with Wittgenstein,
I have always suspected that it was an untenable mixture of ‘empirical meth-
ods and conceptual confusion’.5 But the difficulty here is not that: for one
can see that what is being investigated in these papers—it is what people
think or believe, including the impact on their degree of conviction, such that
‘. . . priming a belief in moral realism improved moral behavior’.6 So, in the
end, the concern for the authors of these papers begins from, ‘What do people
think?’. Perhaps that is legitimate as sociology: but could it have a place in
philosophy? If ‘most people’ agreed on a certain mathematical result, that
alone would not make it right. And my concern in philosophy is only with
what they ought to think (that is, with the truth)—and that is what they
ought to think, since the alternative is to be deceived or deluded (as, say, in
the case of the Yeti, if there are no Yetis). After all, if moral realism is false,
any ‘believers’ have found a new way to delude themselves—or others.
This seems to me where a concern with the conceptual (in philosophy)
contrasts with a concern with people’s views or their practice: yes, they do say
such-and-such . . . but are they right so to do? And we cannot turn philosophy
into a game of Family Feud (USA)/Family Fortunes (UK) by trying to match
our answer to what ‘most people’ think. To decide on the rightness of their
claims, we must address what precisely they say (looking at its implications,
and such like), not merely reiterate their words. So if one asks ‘Why do people
say this?’, my answer has been, ‘because they think it true’. And only that
answer looks like a justification here—false beliefs offer at best explanations
of why they are believed. Moreover, if the views are false, that explanation
for our interest in them disappears.
So the Young and Durwin paper explicitly discusses whether I would be-
have better if I were a moral realist, and concludes I would. If correct, this
offers a practical reason (a bit like Plato’s myth of the metals) to trick people
into being moral realists. But I do not think any trick is needed: people
should be moral realists (in the correct version) if moral realism is true: and
not if it is not. The fact that they might behave better if misguided cannot
have a bearing. And, indeed, I am unhappy about the way in which the result
is arrived at: I take truth to be too important to knowingly permit delusion.
(This seems to me to be the issue with religion: given that [on my view] the
claims of religion are false, it does not matter if believing them helps you live
better or behave better. And if they are true, that cannot be because the
belief helps one live better—assuming it did!)
So think about the religious case, as discussed in the Goodwin and Darley
paper: as the Abstract states the target in the experiment, ‘Groundings which
emphasize the religious . . . underpinnings of ethical belief . . . predicted greater
ethical objectivity’.7 If I had a magic wand, I would want people to realize that
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the grounding idea is misconceived—where this went double for any putative
religious grounding. As above, I do not care how best to ‘engineer’ people
towards a certain view, as what is needed is that each come to recognize the
truth for his/her self.
Of course, like views about the Yeti, all of these views remain held by
people; and it makes sense (I suppose) for sociology and social psychology to
study those people in this respect. But were I right that views such as these
are false, I do not see how there can be philosophical investigation of them.8
At this point it might seem that at least aestheticians are spared from my
rant: they, at least, have no part in the debate mentioned above. Yet what
else is the explanation of trying to use fMRI to understand dance audiences?9
But such studies concern the person’s ability to recognize perceptually (that
is, to see) such difference. For I, at least, would readily concede that a
trained dancer’s account of movements might well be more accurate than1
that of those lacking this training—after all, the dancer has typically seen
those movements more regularly.2 And, for the same reason, the female
dancer may well be more perceptive when considering moves typical of females
in ballet.10 But such investigations rely on what these observers recognise3.
The hope, though, seems to be, somehow, to track aesthetic/artistic responses
to patterns of neural response. But, again, I do not know, nor really care,
about the causal stories here: what remains important are the normative
ones—the sort of things4 art 5critics might help us with. For they operate
at an appropriate explanatory level for one’s coming to understand dances.
And only they will reflect what it is appropriate to find in this dance, or to
say about it.
As Wittgenstein noticed, ‘[m]ental processes just are strange.’11 So that,
concerned about artistic judgements (say, of dance-works), we should not
rush to any particular comparison as just obviously the right one; and es-
pecially a comparison with physical or biological processes. In explanation,
Wittgenstein imagines someone saying:
6The clock shows us the time. What time is, is not yet settled.
And, as regards the point of telling the time—that doesn’t come
in here.712
So the comparison with our knowledge of human psychological processes
acknowledges their diversity: for example, how sometimes what one says
1ik heb hier "that" vervangen door "than"
2hier ontbrak een punt. Die heb ik ingevoegd
3heb ize vervangen door ise
4heb "sorts of thing" vervangen door "sort of things"
5 heb koppelteken vervangen door spatie
6heb quotation marks verwijderd
7idem
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expresses a desire (‘I want a glass of beer’, said to a bartender, is not a de-
scription of my state of mind); or a belief (‘I think John is in LA’ is not mere
autobiography); or a feeling (‘My leg hurts’ is sometimes informational, but
sometimes simply an expression of the pain). To assume that a single model
must do here, since these are all in some sense psychological processes, is to
give in to what, later, Wittgenstein diagnosed as ‘ [a] main cause of philo-
sophical diseases—[namely] a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking
with only one kind of example.’13
Moreover, Wittgenstein rightly deplored the tendency to put off sine die
the detail of matters where the broad contours are assumed; that is, as:
. . . the conception that there are questions the answers to which
will be found at a later date. It is held that, although a result is
not known, there is a way of finding it.14
Later he elaborated the basis of the problem as he saw it:
. . . [t]he first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We
talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided.
Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them—we think. But
that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the
matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to
know a process better . . . 15
So we seem to know the form of the answer: and that form typically comes
from natural science.
Further, if we are told that, while not the whole story, this account of
brain causality is part of the relevant explanation of human mental processes,
we should respond as Wittgenstein did, faced with such an enumerative con-
ception: that ‘then the question would arise: Is that all?’.16 For, faced with
the claim to have explained some part, we are surely owned both an expla-
nation of the parts currently unexplained, and a way to recognize when the
enumerative exercise is complete. Neither is forthcoming; and, to me, could
never be provided in principle, since these ‘parts’ cannot form a finite totality.
It seems David Davies and I broadly agree on the fruitfulness of attempting
to understand dance by reference to empirical work in neuroscience, to judge
by his contribution to the JAAC symposium on Dance, Art and Science.17
At the least, in his paper, David classifies us both as pessimists.18 However,
David is only a moderate pessimist (197) while I am accused of ‘extreme
pessimism’ (199). Then David concludes:
. . . as ever, the moderate pessimist will council modesty when the
philosopher of art elects to dance with neuroscience.19
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I hear the rebuke implicit in this remark: it is positively immodest of me to
behave as I do, voicing my extreme pessimism. Now I must agree that there is
an element of outrage in my pronouncements, perhaps disproportionate to the
evils perpetrated. My only defence here is that, when I see the vast amounts of
money (in the UK, chiefly government money) that such neuroscience-based
research attracts, I am frankly jealous: how can the warnings of Gottlob Frege
and (especially) Ludwig Wittgenstein have gone unheeded?
gmcfee@exchange.fullerton.edu
NOTES
1. Frege 1984, 351.
2. Frege 1979, 137.
3. Frege 1984, 352.
4. The second paper is also interested in the
impact of locating a religious basis for
one’s moral judgements.
5. Wittgenstein 1953, Part Two xiv, Philoso-
phy of Psychology § 371.
6. Abstract to Young and Durwin 2013.
7. They make the same claim for other
groundings, equally contrary to the
Euth8yphro argument—an argument I
take to demonstrate that morality cannot
have an extra-moral grounding.
8. Which is why I understand a social psy-
chology of religious belief, but not a phi-
losophy of it.
9. Calvo-Merino et al. 2005.
10. Montero 2006; Calvo-Merino 2008.
11. Wittgenstein 1953, § 363.
12. Wittgenstein 1953, § 363.
13. Wittgenstein 1953, § 593.
14. Wittgenstein 1979, 182 [December, 1931].
15. Wittgenstein 1953 § 308.
16. Wittgenstein and Waismann 2003, 325.
17. JAAC Vol. 71,9 No.10 2 Spring, 2013.
18. Davies 2013.
19. Davies 2013, 201.
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